UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-27-2020

State v. Smrz Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 47117

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Smrz Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 47117" (2020). Not Reported. 6490.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6490

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
7/27/2020 1 :48 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

NO. 47117-2019

)

v.

)

PAYETTE COUNTY NO. CR38-18-1765

)

PATRICK EDWARD WILLIAM )
SMRZ,
)

REPLY BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF PAYETTE

HONORABLE SUSAN E. WIEBE
District Judge

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone:(208)334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .............................................................................. 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 3
I.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Extrinsic Evidence Of A Specific,
Remote Instance Of Conduct To Impeach Ms. Buck's Credibility
In Violation Ofl.R.E. 608(b) ............................................................................... 3
A. Mr. Smrz's Relevance Objection Preserved His Argument Under
I.R.E. 608(b) Because, As Hayes Clarified, I.R.E. 608(b) Is A
Rule Of Relevance ......................................................................................... 3
B. Ms. Buck's Fifteen-Year-Old Affidavit Was Not Relevant To This
Case, And Therefore, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Admitting The Affidavit As Evidence ............................................................ 5
C. The State Has Failed To Carry Its Burden To Prove That Error
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt.. ........................................................ 8
1. The State's argument failed to address a full half of the required
analysis under the harmless error test ....................................................... 8
2. Even considering the merits of the State's incomplete argument
for harmless error, the State has failed to carry its burden to
prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.. ............................... 9

IL The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Telling Mr. Smrz It Statutorily
Could Not Consider Probation Unless He Participated In The
Presentence Process ........................................................................................... 13
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................... 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138 (2017) ..................................... .4
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ................................................................................ 8
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1 (2009) ...................................................................... 15
Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557 (Ct. App. 1987) .............................................................................. 6
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584 (2013) ....................................................................................... 9
Statev. Anderson, 152 Idaho 21 (Ct. App. 2011) ....................................................................... 14
State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705 (Ct. App. 2013) .................................................................. .4, 6
State v. Downing, 128 Idaho 149 (Ct. App. 1996) ................................................................... .4, 6
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011) ....................................................................................... 3
State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661 (2020) ............................................................................... 8, 9, 14
State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903 (2019) ....................................................................................... .4
State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95 (2019) ....................................................................................... 5
State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 (2017) ............................................................................................. 5
State v. Hayes, 166 Idaho 646 (Mar. 20, 2020) ................................................................ 1, 3, 5, 6
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2013) ...................................................................................... 9, 11, 12
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) ........................................................................................... 8
State v. Reyes,_ P.3d _ , 2020 WL 3496329 (Ct. App. June 29, 2020) .................................. 3
State v. Rocha, 157 Idaho 246 (Ct. App. 2014) ............................................................................ 5
State v. Van Kamen, 160 Idaho 534 (2016) ................................................................................ 13
State v. Villavicencio, 159 Idaho 430 (Ct. App. 2015) ............................................................... 15
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259 (1996) ................................................................................... 7, 14

11

Statutes
I.C. § 19-2521 ........................................................................................................................... 13
I.C. § 20-220 ............................................................................................................................. 13

Rules
I.A.R. 35(i) ................................................................................................................................ 14
I.R.E. 401 ............................................................................................................................ 4, 6, 7
I.R.E. 403 .................................................................................................................................... 5
I.R.E. 608 .................................................................................................................. ......... passim
I.R.E. 609(a) ............................................................................................................................... 4

111

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Patrick Smrz asserted the district court erred by admitting a fifteen-year-old affidavit to
impeach one of his witnesses over his relevance objection.

His initial arguments on appeal

focused primarily on I.R.E. 608(b ). This Reply is needed to address the Idaho Supreme Court's
recent decision in State v. Hayes, 166 Idaho 646, _ , 462 P.3d 1110 (Mar. 20, 2020), reh 'g

denied, which clarified the nature of I.R.E. 608(b) and the appropriate analysis under that rule. It
is also necessary to address the State's mistaken arguments on that issue regarding preservation
and harmless error.
Mr. Smrz also contended the district court abused its discretion by erroneously telling
him it could not consider probation if he did not participate in the presentence process. The
State's response fails to demonstrate that the district court's subsequent consideration of the
factors at the sentencing hearing was not tainted by that misunderstanding of the scope of its
discretion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Smrz's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred by admitting extrinsic evidence of a specific, remote
instance of conduct to impeach Ms. Buck's credibility in violation ofl.R.E. 608(b).

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by telling Mr. Smrz it statutorily could not
consider probation unless he participated in the presentence process.

2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Admitting Extrinsic Evidence Of A Specific, Remote Instance Of
Conduct To Impeach Ms. Buck's Credibility In Violation Ofl.R.E. 608(b)
After Mr. Smrz filed his Appellant's Brief, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision
in Hayes, in which it concluded I.R.E. 608(b) was "unclear." Hayes, 462 P.3d at 1119. As such,
it examined that rule, explaining its role in the overall context of the evidentiary rules, and
clarifying the analysis and burdens applicable with respect to arguments offered under that rule.
Hayes, 462 P.3d at 1118-20. Consistent with those clarifications, Mr. Smrz maintains that the

district court did not properly admit Ms. Buck's affidavit under I.R.E. 608(b), and that it should
not have been admitted at all.

A.

Mr. Smrz's Relevance Objection Preserved His Argument Under I.RE. 608(b) Because,
As Hayes Clarified, I.R.E. 608(b) Is A Rule OfRelevance
The State's first contention is that Mr. Smrz's arguments under I.R.E. 608(b) were not

preserved by his relevance objection. See also State v. Reyes,_ P.3d _ , 2020 WL 3496329,
*4 (Ct. App. June 29, 2020) (questioning, without deciding, whether a non-specific relevance
objection is sufficient to preserve an argument under I.R.E. 608(b), not yet final. That argument
runs contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Hayes, in which the Supreme Court
clarified I.R.E. 608(b) is a "rule of inclusion." Hayes, 462 P.3d at 1118. In other words, if
evidence of a specific incident of conduct falls within the scope of I.R.E. 608(b ), it is relevant to
the witness's character for truthfulness, and thus, is admissible.

See id.

As such, Hayes

demonstrates that I.R.E. 608(b) is a rule of relevance. 1 See id.

1

This is consistent with other Idaho precedents, which have traditionally framed discussions
under I.R.E. 608(b) in terms of relevancy. See, e.g., State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 62
3

Since I.R.E. 608(b) is a rule of relevance, Mr. Smrz's relevance objection preserved his
arguments under that rule for appeal.

It is appropriate for a party to identify additional

authorities and rules in support of an argument on appeal, so long as the party is maintaining the
same position it took below with respect to the issue. Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke
View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 142 n.2 (2017). Accordingly, even when the argument below is
vague, the issue was properly presented on appeal because "[t]he bedrock of [the party's]
appellate argument is present in the record and the district court made a determination on the
issue" in question. State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 914 (2019).
Here, Mr. Smrz argued the issue below, asserting Ms. Buck's affidavit was not relevant
to the elements of the charged offense, particularly given its remote nature.
Tr., p.359, Ls.9-16.)

(Jury Trial

The district court made a determination on that issue, concluding the

objected-to affidavit was relevant for impeachment purposes. (Jury Trial Tr., p.359, Ls.17-21.)
As such, the bedrock of Mr. Smrz's appellate argument - that the affidavit was not relevant,
particularly due to its remoteness - is present in the record, and he has simply cleaned up that
argument for appeal with citations to additional relevant authorities. (See App. Br., p. 7 (quoting,
inter alia, Downing, 128 Idaho at 152, which was evaluating a similar argument under I.R.E. 401
and 608(b )).) Therefore, his objection below was sufficient to preserve his arguments on appeal
under Brooke View and Godwin.

(2011) (holding that the testimony at issue was "highly prejudicial and irrelevant" when it did
not fall under I.R.E. 608(a) or (b)); State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705, 711-12 (Ct. App. 2013)
(holding the district court erred by excluding evidence under I.R.E. 608(b) and 609(a) as
"irrelevant"); State v. Downing, 128 Idaho 149, 152 (Ct. App. 1996) (affirming the district
court's decision that certain evidence was "irrelevant" under I.R.E. 401 and 608(b)).
4

The State's argument to the contrary relies on the Court of Appeals' decision in State v.
Rocha, 157 Idaho 246 (Ct. App. 2014). 2 (Resp. Br., p.8.) However, Rocha is inapposite to this

case. The specific question in Rocha was whether a relevance objection would preserve an
appellate argument under I.R.E. 403. Id. at 251. Rule 403 is not a rule of relevance; rather, it
allows the district court to exclude relevant evidence if that evidence would be unduly
prejudicial. I.RE. 403. Thus, as Rocha pointed out, an argument under I.RE. 403 is a different
position to an argument about relevancy. Therefore, even under Brooke View and its progeny, an
argument under I.RE. 403 would not be preserved by a relevance objection. See, e.g., State v.
Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99 (2019). However, since Hayes made it clear that I.R.E. 608 is a rule

ofrelevance, Rocha's analysis is simply inapplicable to Mr. Srmz's case. 3
Accordingly, this Court should reject the State's preservation arguments and address the
merits of Mr. Smrz's arguments under I.R.E. 608(b).

B.

Ms. Buck's Fifteen-Year-Old Affidavit Was Not Relevant To This Case, And Therefore,
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The Affidavit As Evidence
As Hayes clarified, I.R.E. 608(b) only makes evidence that attacks a witness's character

for truthfulness relevant and admissible. Hayes, 462 P.3d at 1120. Specifically, that means only
evidence which shows the witness has lied, committed fraud, or otherwise acted untruthfully is
relevant and admissible under that rule. Id. The only possible way that Ms. Buck's affidavit
could have fallen under I.R.E. 608(b) is in regard to the inference that she misrepresented herself

2

The State also cites State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 (2017), but only to repeat the rule discussed in
Rocha - that an objection on one ground will not preserve an objection on another ground. Since
Mr. Smrz is arguing the same ground below and on appeal - relevancy - the rule from Hall is
simply not applicable here.
3
Even if Rocha did purport to hold an argument under I.R.E. 608(b) was not preserved by
Mr. Smrz's relevance objection, it would, particularly in light of Hayes, be abrogated by the
Idaho Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Brooke View and its progeny, such as Godwin.
5

as an attorney m that pnor situation.

(See generally Exhibits, pp.21-22.)

However, the

prosecutor affirmatively disavowed that particular line of analysis, as he stated he assumed
Ms. Buck's denial of those allegations was honest. (Jury Trial Tr., p.360, Ls.21-24; see also
Resp. Br., p.9 (disavowing that particular analysis as well).) Since the affidavit was not being
offered to prove Ms. Buck's character for untruthfulness, it was not relevant, and thus, not
admissible as a specific instance evidence for the purposes of impeachment, under I.R.E. 608(b).
However, as the Hayes Court made clear, just because evidence is not admissible under
I.R.E. 608(b ), that does not necessarily mean the district court erred by admitting it under the
general rules of admissibility contained in I.R.E. 401, et seq. Hayes, 462 P.3d at 1118, 20
(noting the party opposing admission bears the burden to prove otherwise-relevant evidence
inadmissible under the rules). In this case, the evidence was not admissible under I.R.E. 401
because of its remoteness. (App. Br., p.7 (quoting Downing, 128 Idaho at 152, which had held
certain evidence was not relevant under I.R.E. 401 as well as I.R.E. 608(b) despite its potentially
impeaching qualities because of its remoteness).) 4
Specifically, in Downing, the remoteness made the evidence irrelevant because of the
potential for changes in the witness's maturity over the intervening years. Downing, 128 Idaho
at 152 (specifically dealing with a witness who was fifteen years old); accord Bergerud, 155
Idaho at 712 (clarifying it was the combination of remoteness as well as that the witness was
maturing during the intervening years that made the evidence inadmissible in Downing). While
those precise differences may not exist in this case, the principle guiding the analysis in Downing
4

Mr. Smrz notes there is potential for confusion in his citation to Downing in the Appellant's
Brief, in that the parenthetical statement "specifically evaluating whether evidence of behavior
some nine years past was admissible under I.RE. 608" could be read to refer to the case
Downing was quoting (Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 559 (Ct. App. 1987)), rather than, as it was
intended, to Downing itself (See App. Br., p.7.) Mr. Smrz apologizes for any confusion in that
regard.
6

is still applicable here. Most notably, there is no indication that Ms. Buck was trying to assist
Mr. Smrz in investigating his case in the same way the old affidavit discussed; rather, in this
case, she was simply serving as a fact witness.
(Ms. Buck's trial testimony).)

(See generally Jury Trial Tr., pp.302-83

Therefore, her long-past efforts to assist in his defense in a

different case were not particularly probative as to whether she still had, fifteen years later, the
potential for bias based on the fact that she was friends with Mr. Smrz. Therefore, the difference
in situation over the course of a fifteen-year interval reveal that, as in Downing, those past events
are simply too remote to be relevant under I.R.E. 401, even for impeachment purposes.
Certainly, this is not to say that a prosecutor can never explore the potential that a defense
witness is biased toward the defendant, who is a friend of hers. The issue here is whether the
district court improperly allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence about a specific instance
of other conduct which was, itself, too remote to be relevant to that inquiry under the applicable
legal standards.
The State has not actually addressed Mr. Smrz's argument about the remoteness of the
affidavit, either below or on appeal. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.8-9; Jury Trial Tr., p. Jury Trial
Tr., p.359, Ls.9-21.)

Rather, all it argued was that, because the evidence has potential

impeaching qualities, it was relevant and admissible.

(Resp. Br., pp.8-9; see Jury Trial

Tr., p.359, Ls.17-19.) A party waives an issue when it fails to provide argument or authority on
that issue. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). Therefore, since Ms. Buck's fifteen-yearold affidavit was not made admissible under I.R.E. 608(b) and, due to its remoteness, it had no
relevance under I.R.E. 401, the district court erred by admitting that affidavit over Mr. Smrz's
relevance objection.

7

C.

The State Has Failed To Carry Its Burden To Prove That Error Harmless Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt

1.

The State's argument failed to address a full half of the required analysis under
the harmless error test

As the Idaho Supreme Court has recently clarified, the harmless error analysis involves a
two-part evaluation: ''weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the
erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error."

State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, _ , 462 P.3d 1125, 1138 (2020). This is more than simply a
determination of whether the verdict could be sustained by the other evidence in the record. Id.
Rather, that evaluation requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the effect of
the error itself was minimal or unimportant when weighed against the probative force of the
untainted record, such that the error itself did not contribute to the verdict ultimately rendered.

Id.; accord State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 & 227 (2010) (explaining that the standard from
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), means the State has "the burden of
demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation
did not contribute to the jury's verdict"). 5
Despite actually acknowledging Garcia (Resp. Br., p.9), the State offered no analysis on
the critical second half of that test articulated in that case - no argument regarding the probative
impact that the erroneous impeachment of Ms. Buck had in comparison to that other evidence, or
that the error did not still contribute to the verdict in connection with that other evidence. (See

generally Resp. Br.) By failing to specifically address a part of the test that it is clearly required
to prove, this Court should reject the State's harmless error argument outright. State v. Almaraz,

5

Perry also made it clear that the Chapman standard applies equally to all objected-to errors,
constitutional or non-constitutional. Perry, 150 Idaho at 221.
8

154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013) (holding that, since "the State never specifically argues that [the
erroneous evidence] did not 'contribute to the verdict obtained' as clearly required under Perry,"
the State "has failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict in
this case would have been the same even if [the erroneous evidence] had not been admitted").
Rather, the State has essentially made the same sort of "overwhelming evidence"
argument that was clearly rejected in Garcia. (See Resp. Br., pp.9-10) (simply arguing that the
verdict would be the same without the error because the prosecutor had conducted other
impeachment of Ms. Buck and several other witnesses had testified that Mr. Smrz was living
with Ms. Buck).) Its argument to that effect should be rejected for the same reasons such
arguments were rejected in Garcia.

2.

Even considering the merits of the State's incomplete argument for harmless
error, the State has failed to carry its burden to prove the error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt

Even if this Court considers the merits of the State's harmless error argument, it should
find the error not harmless because the force of the error was not minimal in the whole context of
this case. See Garcia, 462 P .3d at 113 8. Ms. Buck was one of only two people with direct
knowledge about whether Mr. Smrz actually changed his residence to her house. Mr. Smrz was
the other person with direct knowledge, but he exercised his Fifth Amendment right to not
testify. (See, e.g., Jury Trial Tr., p.416, Ls.1-6 (the district court instructing the jury on this
point).) As a result, this case turned primarily on the jury's credibility determination between
Ms. Buck and the State's witnesses. In other words, her testimony was of particular importance
in the context of this case, and thus, the impact of the error affecting the evaluation of her
credibility was not harmless when considered in context of the full case as Garcia requires.
Compare State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11-12 (2013).

9

In Joy, as here, the core question for the jurors came down to a credibility determination.
Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that error, which impacted that determination, was not

harmless because the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had not
contributed to the jurors' resolution of that core issue. Id. In reaching that conclusion, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that there was other circumstantial evidence besides the testimony
of the central witnesses upon which the jury might have based its verdict. Id. However, the
mere existence of such evidence was insufficient to prove that the error itself had not still
contributed to the jurors' decision, and so, the mere existence of such evidence would not render
the error harmless. Id.
Likewise, in Mr. Smrz's case, there may have been other evidence upon which the jury's
verdict could have been based, but that alone does not prove the error, which impacted on the
credibility determination at the core of the case, was not still important in the overall context of
the jury's determination.

For example, while there was other evidence tending to impeach

Ms. Buck's testimony, that evidence was based on statements Mr. Smrz made to her, not
statements she made to other people. (See State's Exhibit 6.) Additionally, as discussed in
Section I(B), supra, the erroneously-introduced evidence did more than suggest just Ms. Buck's
fact testimony might be biased by her friendship with Mr. Smrz; it suggested that Ms. Buck
would be willing to participate in crafting Mr. Smrz's defense and potentially even misrepresent
facts in doing so. 6

(See Exhibits, pp.21-22.) As such, the State has not proved beyond a

reasonable doubt that the mere existence of other impeaching evidence rendered the probative
force of the erroneously-introduced evidence to be minimal in the context of this case.
6

While the prosecutor asserted that he believed Ms. Buck's denial of that allegation, there is no
requirement for the jury to accept that view of Ms. Buck's affidavit. It does not appear that the
district court gave a limiting instruction with regard to that evidence, or that such an instruction
was requested by either party. (See generally R., Tr.)

The same is true of the other witnesses' testimony.

That is because all that other

testimony circumstantial on the critical point - all those other witnesses could say was that,
based on frequently seeing Mr. Smrz at the house, they believed he had moved there. As such,
their testimony was anything but overwhelming, particularly when weighed against Ms. Buck's
testimony that, while he did visit and keep some of his property there, she did not let him
actually reside there. Cf Joy, 155 Idaho at 11-12 (explaining that, where the error affected the
credibility of the central witnesses, the existence of other evidence upon which the jury could
have rested its verdict did not prove the impact of the error itself to be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt).
In fact, the full gamut of those other witnesses' testimony, rather than the selected
portions pulled out by the State and examined in a vacuum (see Resp. Br., pp.9-10), actually
undermines the State's argument under Garcia.

For example, while one of the neighbors,

Mr. Brown, testified he believed Mr. Smrz lived at Ms. Buck's house, he also admitted that he
did not watch Ms. Buck's house all the time, and that there were several ways a person could
come and go from her house without him seeing. (Jury Trial Tr., p.236, L.18 - p.241, L.1.)
Thus, he had little reliable basis for his conclusion that Mr. Smrz was actually residing there.
Likewise, the other neighbor, Ms. Grandados, admitted her observations of the house were
fleeting and that "I haven't paid attention" to it. (Jury Trial Tr., p.248, Ls.4-5, 12-13.) In fact,
Ms. Grandados' full testimony reveals her observations were so sparse that she did not realize
Ms. Buck actually lived at the house. (See Jury Trial Tr., p.246, Ls.5-7 (testifying she believed
only Mr. Smrz lived at the house).) As such, her conclusion that the house was Mr. Smrz's
residence was even less reliable than Mr. Brown's. Therefore, under Garcia's framework, the

11

full context of the neighbors' testimony provides little probative force to outweigh the significant
impact of the error in the overall context of the case.
The similar shortcomings exist in the testimony of Ms. Kyniston and her mother,
Ms. Birdsong. Notably, Ms. Kyniston's testimony reveals their own potential for bias against
Mr. Smrz - their disapproval of his offer to be a suitor for Ms. Kyniston's daughter when she
turned eighteen. (See, e.g., Jury Trial Tr., p.395, Ls.1-16.) Moreover, Ms. Kyniston testified that
she was licensed to grow marijuana in Oregon, and, under that license, she was not allowed to
grow marijuana for a person living in another state. (Jury Trial Tr., p.400, L.15 - L.401, L.21.)
That is important, since she also admitted she grows medical marijuana for Mr. Smrz. (Jury
Trial Tr., p.401, Ls.17-19.)

Therefore, Ms. Kyniston's testimony contained evidence which

indicated that Mr. Smrz did, in fact, continue to reside in Oregon despite frequently visiting
Ms. Buck, lest Ms. Kyniston was admitting a knowing violation of the terms of her marijuana
license. Again, the full context of that other evidence in the record does not show the probative
impact of the erroneously-introduced evidence against Ms. Buck to have been minimal or that it
did not also contribute to the verdict. Compare Joy, 155 Idaho at 11-12.
Therefore, even if this Court considers the merits of the State's partial argument for
harmless error, the State has failed to carry its burden to prove this error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. As such, this Court should vacate Mr. Smrz' s resulting conviction because of
that error.

12

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Telling Mr. Smrz It Statutorily Could Not Consider
Probation Unless He Participated In The Presentence Process
The State does not contest the legal premise of Mr. Smrz's argument on this issue - that
the district court maintains discretion under LC. § 20-220 to put a defendant on probation even if
he does not participate in the presentence investigation process. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.1112; compare App. Br., pp.8-10.) Thus, the State has effectively conceded that the district court
erred when it told Mr. Smrz it was statutorily prevented from considering probation "if you don't
participate in a pre-sentence investigation." 7 (Jury Trial Tr., p.468, Ls.22-24.)
Rather, the State essentially tries to contend that error was harmless because, at the
ensuing sentencing hearing, the district court said it had considered whether probation was
appropriate under LC. § 19-2521. (Resp. Br., p.11 (quoting Sentencing Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.7,
L. 1).) That argument is not persuasive because the district court's statement at the sentencing
hearing is not mutually exclusive with its prior, erroneous statement. The district court easily
could have evaluated whether probation might have been appropriate given the factors discussed
in LC. § 19-2521 and still, based on its asserted, not-officially-retracted, and erroneous
understanding of LC. § 20-220, decided it could not order an otherwise-merited period of
probation because Mr. Smrz had not fully participated in the presentencing investigation process.
Thus, the district court's comments at the sentencing hearing did not cure this error.

7

The State did contend that the district court's statement should be read only to indicate the that
it could not order probation without a PSI. (Resp. Br., p.12.) That argument is disingenuous
because it ignores the district court's actual words, which were clearly focused on Mr. Smrz's
participation in the presentence investigation process, and not the mere existence of a PSI
document. Compare State v. Van Kamen, 160 Idaho 534, 540 (2016) (noting the importance of
the district court's actual words in such evaluations, holding that, where the district court's actual
words revealed its decision was based on an erroneous consideration, that decision needed to be
vacated even though the Court noted it would have been possible for the district court to have
reached the same decision in a proper manner).
13

Beyond that, the district court's erroneous pronouncement certainly altered Mr. Smrz's
decision of whether to exercise his right to not participate in the first place. Specifically, while
the district court acknowledged Mr. Smrz' s right to not participate, it still reaffirmed that, if he
exercised that right, it could not consider probation:

"You have the right not to make

incriminating statements. You are right. But you can voluntarily agree to participate in the
investigation. If you choose not to, I cannot consider probation. I'm just telling you that." (Jury
Trial Tr., p.469, Ls.20-24.) Since he conceded that he would participate as a direct result of that
assertion (Jury Trial Tr., p.460, Ls. I 0-12), the State has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the impact of the error was minimal in the whole context of the case. See Garcia, 462 P.3d
at 1138.
Rather, in this regard, this case is very similar to State v. Anderson, 152 Idaho 21
(Ct. App. 2011), which the State noticeably failed to cite at all. 8 (See generally Resp. Br.;

compare App. Br., p.9.) In Anderson, the district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty
years, with ten years fixed, following a conviction for second-degree murder. Anderson, 152
Idaho at 22. On its face, that would appear to be a reasonable sentence under the controlling
statute. Id. at 23. However, when the district court denied Mr. Anderson's subsequent motion
for leniency, its actual words revealed that it had not properly understood the scope of its
discretion when it imposed that sentence. Id. (specifically that the district court believed there

8

In fact, the State fails to cite any authority for any of its particular arguments on this issue. (See
generally Resp. Br., pp.10-12 (citing only the applicable standard of review).) Since a party
waives an issue if it fails to include either argument or authority, this Court should reject the
State's unsupported arguments on this issue. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263; cf I.AR. 35(i) (allowing
for arguments to be made without citation to authorities only when the appeal deals with the
severity of the sentence itself or challenges to the revocation of probation, neither of which is at
issue here).
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had to be a minimum fixed term of ten years). As such, the Court of Appeals vacated that
sentence. Id.
Here, as in Anderson, the district courts actual words at the end of the jury trial, words
which it has not actually disavowed on the record, indicates it did not act with a proper
understanding of the full scope of its discretion when it made its sentencing decision, even if it
had looked to see whether probation might otherwise have been warranted. Therefore, as in
Anderson, any decision it made while possessed of that misunderstanding of the scope of its

discretion needs to be vacated and the matter remanded for reconsideration by the district court.
See also State v. Villavicencio, 159 Idaho 430, 437 (Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that, because the

district court did not recognize the full scope of its discretion, the ruling on the motion at issue
had to be vacated and the case remanded "to allow the district court to reconsider the motion to
correct the illegal sentences with knowledge of the full scope of its discretion.") The reason that
is the case is that "[w]hen the discretion exercised by a trial court is affected by an error oflaw,
the role of the appellate court is to note the error made and remand the case for appropriate
findings." Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009).
Since the district court's sentencing decision was made under the auspice of its
misunderstanding of the scope of its discretion, this Court should vacate the resulting sentencing
decision.

15

CONCLUSION
Mr. Smrz respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand this case for a
new trial. Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate the sentence and remand this
case for new sentencing.
DATED this 27 th day of July, 2020.
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